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Abstract
This paper reviews the theory of foreign direct investment (FDI), focusing on an apparent con￿ ict between
theory and recent trends in the globalized world. The bulk of FDI is horizontal rather than vertical, but
horizontal FDI is discouraged when trade costs fall. This seems to con￿ ict with the experience of the
1990s, when trade liberalisation and technological change led to dramatic reductions in trade costs yet FDI
grew much faster than trade. Two possible resolutions to this paradox are explored. First, horizontal FDI
in trading blocs is encouraged by intra-bloc trade liberalisation, because foreign ￿rms establish plants in
one country as export platforms to serve the bloc as a whole. Second, cross-border mergers, which are
quantitatively more important than green￿eld FDI, are encouraged rather than discouraged by falling trade
costs.
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Foreign direct investment (FDI) is one of the key features of the modern globalized world. While some traders
maintained international links in the late medieval and early modern periods, and multinational ￿rms became
important in many industries in the late nineteenth century, the period since the Second World War and
in particular since about 1985 saw an explosion in FDI, both in absolute terms and relative to the levels of
trade and GDP.1
Matching these real-world developments, an extensive economic literature has developed in recent years
which attempts to explain the nature, causes and consequences of FDI.2 The central plank of the now-
standard theoretical framework used in this literature is the so-called proximity-concentration trade-o⁄.
This suggests that FDI occurs when the bene￿ts of producing close to a foreign market outweigh the loss of
economies of scale from producing exclusively in the ￿rm￿ s home plant. As we will see, there is much to be
said for this model, and a lot of empirical evidence in support of it. However, it makes a key prediction which
seems to run counter to the experience of the 1990s. If FDI is driven primarily by the proximity-concentration
trade-o⁄, then falls in trade costs should discourage it, as the bene￿ts of concentrated production increasingly
outweigh the gains from improved market access. It should be emphasized that trade costs include both
tari⁄s and transport costs, and that measuring them in even the simplest contexts poses major conceptual
adn practical problems.3 Yet it seems incontrovertible that both technical and policy-induced barriers to
trade fell dramatically during the 1990s. This is especially true within Europe, where trade barriers were
dramatically reduced under the EU Single Market programme, even as FDI boomed.
This apparent paradox is the organizing principle of the paper, which presents a selective overview of the
theory and empirics of FDI. The paper ￿rst outlines the simplest case of horizontal FDI, and then considers
in turn vertical FDI, export-platform FDI and cross-border mergers and acquisitions. Throughout I try to
present results in the simplest possible way, paring the models down to their essentials to focus attention on
the key assumptions, and making use of diagrams where possible. As we will see, there are many ways of
explaining the paradox, but their relative empirical importance remains to be determined.
1See UNCTAD (2000), Markusen (2002, Chapter 1) and Barba Navaretti and Venables (2004, Chapter 1) for summaries of
the stylized facts about FDI.
2Markusen (2002) and Barba Navaretti and Venables (2004) give overviews of the theory of FDI and multinational corpo-
rations.
3See Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) and Anderson and Neary (2005).
12 The Proximity-Concentration Trade-O⁄
I begin with the simplest framework in which the proximity-concentration trade-o⁄ can be illustrated.4
Consider a single potential multinational which is the monopoly supplier of a product and seeks to determine
the optimal mode of serving a foreign market. The assumption that the ￿rm is a monopoly can be related
to the ￿O￿ in the ￿OLI￿ or Ownership-Location-Internalization framework of Dunning (1973): the ￿rm
possesses unique advantages in terms of product quality, marketing, organisation or R&D, which give it an
ownership advantage over other potential ￿rms. It is also consistent with models of monopolistic competition:
many ￿rms compete against each other, each producing a symmetrically di⁄erentiated product, but from
the perspective of an individual ￿rm the demand function it faces is given. Of course, the assumption is
not consistent with perceived interdependence between oligopolistic ￿rms, which seems a priori likely to
characterise the markets in which many multinational corporations operate. However, the main points I
want to make do not require an oligopolistic setting and I postpone consideration of oligopoly until Section
5. I also concentrate throughout the paper on a single industry in partial equilibrium. Embedding such an
industry in general equilibrium is essential for a complete analysis, and much recent research in the theory
of FDI has done just this. However, the points I wish to highlight can be adequately addressed in partial
equilibrium.
The operating pro￿ts which the ￿rm earns in the foreign or host-country market depend on many factors,
some under its control (such as output and advertising) others not. Assume in this section that these factors
are independent of the manner in which the ￿rm serves the market. In particular, there is no comparative
advantage reason which makes it cheaper or more expensive to produce in the ￿rm￿ s home country or in the
host country. In that case we can focus on a single key determinant of operating pro￿ts, the unit cost of
serving the market, denoted by t. Once again, part of this cost is independent of how the market is served:
marketing, distribution and after-sales service costs for example. However, for our purposes it makes sense
to focus on the incremental cost of serving the market from abroad, so t should be understood as a measure
of the external trade barrier, which is zero if the ￿rm locates in the market and otherwise includes both
tari⁄s and transport costs. Hence we can write the ￿rm￿ s operating pro￿ts as a reduced form function of
t, ￿(t), where all the other determinants of operating pro￿ts, which are independent of how the market is
served, are subsumed into the ￿ function. It is easy to check that a rise in t reduces both sales and pro￿ts
in the market, so ￿0 is negative. (See the Appendix for more details.)
We can now state the ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts from alternative ways of serving the market. If it does so via exports
then its total pro￿ts ￿X are simply ￿(t). Of course, the ￿rm also incurs ￿xed costs in its home country: these
4The model in this section is standard. See for example, Smith (1987, Section 2) or Markusen (2002, Chapter 2). The
analytic properties of Fig. 1 are taken from Neary (2002).
2are an important determinant of its willingness to serve the foreign market at all, but they are independent
of how it does so, so little is lost by ignoring them. By contrast, investing in a local plant to serve the market
will incur additional ￿xed costs which we denote f. (It is convenient to interpret ￿xed costs as measured
with respect to the size of the domestic market: see the appendix for a justi￿cation.) The bene￿t from
this proximity is the saving on trade costs, which boosts operating pro￿ts to ￿ (0). Hence the total pro￿ts
from engaging in FDI, which we denote ￿F, equal ￿(0) ￿ f: The choice between FDI and exports therefore
depends on the trade-cost-jumping gain, which we denote ￿ (t;f):




) ￿ ￿(0) ￿ f ￿ ￿(t) (1)
As the signs under the arguments indicate, this gain is increasing in trade costs t but decreasing in ￿xed
costs f.
All this can be illustrated in (f;t) space as in Figure 1. Pro￿ts from exporting, ￿X, are independent of
f, decreasing in t, and strictly positive for t < ~ t , where ~ t is the threshold tari⁄ at which exports are just
pro￿table, and is de￿ned by ￿(~ t) = 0. By contrast, pro￿ts from FDI, ￿F, are independent of t, decreasing in
f, and strictly positive for f less than the threshold level of ￿xed costs ￿(0) at which FDI is just pro￿table.
It is now easy to read o⁄ the ￿gure the di⁄erent modes of serving the market which a pro￿t-maximising ￿rm
will choose. If both trade costs and ￿xed costs are above their threshold values then the ￿rm cannot make
positive pro￿ts and so will not serve the market at all: this corresponds to the region denoted ￿O￿ . If only
one cost variable exceeds its threshold value then the ￿rm will opt for the one mode of serving the market
which yields positive pro￿ts. Finally, if both variables are below their threshold values, then both modes are
pro￿table, and the choice between them depends on the sign of ￿F ￿ ￿X given by (1). Setting this equal
to zero de￿nes the boundary between the regions in Figure 1 in which the ￿rm will engage in exports and
FDI, labelled ￿X￿and ￿FDI￿respectively.
This analysis is the foundation of the proximity-concentration trade-o⁄, and its implications are clear.
Higher ￿xed costs favour exporting over FDI, whereas higher trade costs favour FDI over exporting. Fur-
thermore, the same ￿rm never engages in both FDI and trade.5 The model is a disarmingly simple one,
and it is worth teasing out the riches of its implications. It can be interpreted in either a time-series or
cross-section context, and, though it is stated explicitly in terms of a single ￿rm, it can also be applied
at the level of sectors or whole countries. Thus for comparisons across time the model implies that falls
in trade costs should encourage FDI relative to exports, and vice versa. For comparisons across sectors it
5The model has been extended by Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) to allow ￿rms within the same monopolistically
competitive industry to have di⁄erent e¢ ciency levels. This permits two-way ￿ows of FDI, but still predicts that a given ￿rm
will engage in either FDI or trade and not both.
3implies that lower trade costs should be associated with more exports relative to FDI and vice versa. And
for comparisons across space it implies that closer markets should be served by exports and further ones by
FDI.
Since I will spend much of the rest of the paper criticizing these implications, it is only fair to begin
by noting that there is considerable though not overwhelming evidence in their favour. Consider ￿rst the
econometric evidence. Brainard (1993) showed that, as trade and transport costs rise, the level of outward
FDI from the U.S. (measured by local sales of U.S. a¢ liates) falls, but the share of FDI in a¢ liate sales
plus U.S. exports rises. Thus while the predictions of the theory are not borne out in an absolute sense they
are con￿rmed in relative terms: lower trade costs lead to a substitution away from FDI towards exports.
Similar results are found by Carr, Markusen and Maskus (2001) and by Yeaple (2003b). However, results
for the e⁄ects of distance (which is positively but not strongly correlated with transport costs) are less
favorable to the theory.6 Both FDI and exports fall with distance, and its e⁄ects on the share of FDI is
sensitive to the speci￿cation used. Of course, distance may be proxying for factors other than trade costs,
such as the costs of communicating with foreign subsidiaries, but this is clearly inconsistent with the simple
proximity-concentration trade-o⁄.
Over and above this econometric evidence, there is also considerable case-study evidence which is con-
sistent with the proximity-concentration trade-o⁄. Indeed, case studies are an important supplement to
econometric estimates and often highlight special features which large-sample econometric studies are likely
to miss. Let me mention two. The ￿rst is the experience of Ireland in the 1930￿ s, which transformed rapidly
from an extremely open economy to a highly protected one following a change of government in 1932.7 (See
Neary and ￿ GrÆda (1991) for details and further references.) Despite the small size of the Irish market,
the theory would predict a large in￿ ow of FDI. Yet this did not occur until six years later. The reason is
simple: protection had been imposed by the new nationalist government as part of a campaign to reduce
British in￿ uence in Ireland; when British ￿rms responded by trying to set up a¢ liates in Ireland the Irish
government passed new legislation prohibiting their doing so. Only when this legislation was relaxed in 1938
did FDI increase signi￿cantly. A second case study is that of Japanese electronics ￿rms in the European
Community (EC) in the late 1980s by Belderbos and Sleuwaegen (1998). They concluded that the rapid
increase in Japanese manufacturing investments in the late 1980s was mainly induced by EC anti-dumping
and other trade restricting measures targeting Japanese ￿rms and that such tari⁄-jumping investment sub-
stituted for exports from Japan. But since anti-dumping duties are a form of contingent protection, the
6I am indebted to Stephen Yeaple for these ￿ndings.
7￿Ireland￿ is used here to refer to the political unit which was an independent state from 1922 until 1949 though with a
constitutionally ambiguous status in international law, re￿ected in its o¢ cial designation as the ￿Irish Free State￿. It became
a republic in 1949.
4e⁄ect of FDI was not merely to evade tari⁄s but to ensure that they were not imposed in the ￿rst place.
The busy econometrician (busy because she has hundreds of other data points to worry about) would in the
case of Ireland in the mid-1930s observe protection but no FDI, and in the case of EC a¢ liates of Japanese
electronics ￿rms in the late 1980s observe FDI but no protection. Yet both episodes are fully consistent
with the logic of the proximity-concentration trade-o⁄, once it is supplemented by obvious features of the
institutional and political context.
Nevertheless, there remains the puzzle noted in the introduction. How can the theory be reconciled with
the enormous increase in FDI in the 1990s, especially into the European Union? Clearly tari⁄s and transport
costs fell dramatically, but FDI rose much faster than exports. With Ireland as a prime example of a host
country which bene￿tted enormously from this in￿ ow, how is it that the simple theory explains the Irish
experience in the 1930s but not in the 1990s? A clue may come from an old literature which explored the issue
of whether exports and FDI are substitutes or complements in competitive factor-endowment models. This
literature was initiated by Mundell (1957), who showed that they are perfect substitutes in the textbook two-
sector two-country Heckscher-Ohlin model: barriers to trade encourage international capital ￿ ows which if
unimpeded lead to an equilibrium identical to that which would obtain under free trade. However, extensions
by Markusen (1983), Jones and Neary (1984) and Neary (1995) among others showed that trade liberalisation
can encourage FDI if the induced capital ￿ ows enter the export sector, because countries di⁄er either in
technology or in endowments of sector-speci￿c factors. This literature has fallen out of fashion, as its view
of FDI as physical ￿ ows of a productive factor has given way to an industrial-organisation inspired view of
FDI as an intra-￿rm transfer of intangible assets by multinational corporations. But its insights can help
explain the anomalies we have found in the predictions of the proximity-concentration trade-o⁄ hypothesis.
In the next two sections we turn to two such approaches.
3 Vertical versus Horizontal FDI
The ￿rst framework in which FDI may encourage rather than substitute for exports is when it is vertical rather
than horizontal. The theory of vertical FDI originated with Helpman (1984), who showed in a Heckscher-
Ohlin model that, when stages of production di⁄er in their factor intensities, international di⁄erences in
factor endowments give incentives for vertical disintegration by ￿rms. More generally, it can arise from any
comparative-advantage reason which makes it more pro￿table to locate one or more stages of production
outside the market where the ￿nal good is sold.
The simplest example of vertical FDI, and one that is easily linked to the model of the last section, is
where the ￿rm has two stages of production: ￿headquarter services￿(in Helpman￿ s phrase) provide internal
5public goods to the ￿rm, are located in the parent country and incur ￿xed costs only, while the production
stage can be located wherever it is most pro￿table to do so. Assuming for simplicity that each unit of output
requires a single unit of labour, we can write the operating pro￿ts of serving the parent market as ￿￿ (c),
where c includes both factor costs and market access costs. Ignoring demand in the host country for the
present, the ￿rm now has two options. If it remains a domestic ￿rm and supplies its market from its parent
plant, where w￿ is the local wage rate, its pro￿ts will equal ￿￿ (w￿), which we can denote ￿D. Alternatively,
it can engage in FDI and locate a new plant in the host country which exports all its output back to the
parent country, incurring a trade cost of t￿. In that case, it incurs a plant-speci￿c ￿xed cost f as in the
previous section, and earns operating pro￿ts of ￿￿ (w + t￿), where w is the host-country wage. The relative
pro￿tability of FDI now becomes:




) ￿ ￿￿(w + t￿) ￿ ￿￿(w￿) (2)
The new element is ￿(w + t￿;w￿) which we can call the ￿o⁄shoring gain.￿Crucially it is decreasing in the
parent country tari⁄, so trade liberalisation will encourage FDI. Figure 2 illustrates. Now the FDI region
corresponds to low values of both ￿xed costs and trade costs.
If the host country market is non-negligible then we get a combination of vertical and horizontal motives.
Now the choice between FDI and staying at home (labelled ￿DX￿ since it involves producing for both
domestic sales and exports) depends on the sum of the tari⁄-jumping and o⁄shoring gains:






) ￿ ￿(w) ￿ f ￿ ￿(w￿ + t) (3)
The tari⁄-jumping gain function ￿ is identical to that in the last section. Hence the two tari⁄s have opposite
e⁄ects on FDI: falls in the host country tari⁄ tend to discourage it while falls in the parent country tari⁄
tend to encourage it. If both tari⁄s are reduced in equal proportions the e⁄ect is ambiguous, and depends
on the relative sizes of the two markets and the di⁄erences in wages and trade costs.
Faced with these theoretical ambiguities, it is natural to look at the empirical evidence for guidance on the
relative importance of the two motives. At a purely descriptive level, Brainard (1997) and Markusen (2002,
Chapter 1) note that foreign a¢ liates of U.S. ￿rms export relatively small amounts of their output back to
the U.S., between 13% and 15% depending on the year, with a¢ liates in Canada as a noteworthy but not
unexpected exception. Turning to econometric evidence, Brainard (1997) ￿nds that FDI is high in industry-
country pairs with high transport costs and low plant scale economies, while international di⁄erences in
relative factor abundance have little e⁄ect on FDI. All of this is consistent with the view that FDI is
6primarily horizontal rather than vertical. In the same vein, Markusen (2001) ￿nds evidence that bilateral
￿ ows of FDI are encouraged by similarities in market size and in relative endowments of skilled and unskilled
labour between countries, and interprets this as evidence against the importance of vertical FDI. On the other
hand, Yeaple (2003b), while con￿rming the importance of the proximity-concentration motive, ￿nds that,
other things equal, U.S. multinationals invest more in skill-scarce countries than in skill-abundant countries
in the least skilled-labour-intensive industries. He notes that this is consistent with a comparative advantage
or vertical view of FDI. We can conclude that the case against the vertical FDI model is not proven but that
the case in favour is not strong enough to explain the paradox of trade liberalisation coexisting with FDI
growth.
4 Export-Platform FDI
In this section I consider a di⁄erent way to resolve the paradox noted in Section 2, drawing on my work
on export-platform FDI in Neary (2002).8 Suppose that the model is identical to that in Section 2, except
that the host country is one of two identical countries in a potential economic union. The previous analysis
still holds when intra-union barriers are equal to t, with the added implication that the FDI option implies
establishing two plants, one in each union country.
Now, suppose that intra-union barriers are reduced to a level ￿ which is less than the common external
trade cost t. Clearly this does not a⁄ect the pro￿ts from exporting to both countries from the ￿rm￿ s country
of origin: these continue to equal ￿(t) for each destination country as in Section 2, so the total pro￿ts from
exporting, ￿X, equals twice this, 2￿(t). However, the pro￿ts from locating a plant in one of the union
countries are now greater: in addition to the net pro￿ts of serving the host-country market ￿(0) ￿ f , there
is an additional gain from serving the partner-country market, ￿(￿). Hence the total pro￿ts from FDI, ￿F,
equal ￿ (0) + ￿(￿) ￿ f, and the relative attractiveness of FDI is now:




) ￿ ￿(￿) ￿ ￿(t) (4)
Now there are two sources of gain from FDI. As before, ￿ (t;f) ￿ ￿(0) ￿ f ￿ ￿(t) is the trade-cost-jumping
gain as the host-country market is served from a local plant rather than from exports. In addition, ￿(t;￿)
denotes the gain from serving the partner-country market facing the intra-union trade cost ￿ rather than
the higher common external trade cost t. We can call this the export-platform gain. Two implications are
immediate. First, FDI is now more attractive relative to exporting. Unlike the trade-cost-jumping gain which
8For other discussions of this topic, see Motta and Norman (1996), Yeaple (2003a), Ekholm, Forslid and Markusen (2003)
and Grossman, Helpman and Szeidl (2004).
7can be positive or negative, the export-platform gain is always non-negative. This implies for example that
the size of a host-country market is not a crucial determinant of locating a new plant there. What matters
is the size of the trade-cost-adjusted market which can be served from that plant. Second, and crucial for
the theme of this paper, the export-platform gain is decreasing in the intra-union trade cost ￿ whereas both
it and the trade-cost-jumping gain are increasing in the external trade cost t. Hence, in striking contrast to
the simple horizontal FDI model of Section 2, intra-bloc trade liberalisation tends to encourage FDI, once we
recognize the importance of the export-platform motive. Note that a three-country perspective is essential
for this result: the external trade cost t continues to exert a positive e⁄ect on FDI; indeed, it enhances both
the trade-cost-jumping and the export-platform motives.
Some further implications of this model can be deduced from Figure 3. The region labelled "FDI" in
Figure 1 is one where high trade costs and low ￿xed costs justify building a plant in both of the union
countries. Such a region still exists when ￿ is less than t, provided ￿ is strictly positive: in Figure 3 it is
denoted "FDI (2)". However, it is reduced in size by the emergence of a new region labelled "FDI (1)":
this gives the combinations of f and t where (for given ￿) it is pro￿table to establish a plant in only one
market serving both. Thus, as ￿ falls, the export platform motive favours plant consolidation by ￿rms
already engaged in FDI with multiple plants. The new region also expands at the expense of the X region,
as implied by equation (4). Finally, and more surprisingly, it expands at the expense of the O region, since
export-platform FDI is pro￿table for any ￿xed cost less than ￿(0) + ￿(￿) and greater than ￿ (0), provided
the common external trade cost is above the threshold level ~ t. Thus, as ￿ falls, the export platform motive
not only favours FDI over exporting but it also (for parameter values in the shaded region) favours FDI
over not serving the market at all. A ￿nal implication of the model is that the same ￿rm engages in both
exports and FDI, albeit not across the same frontier: the ￿rm engages in FDI into the host country and
also in exports from there to the partner country. Hence exports and FDI become complements rather than
substitutes in the aggregate data.
This approach avoids many of the criticisms of the simple horizontal FDI model of Section 2. How does
it relate to the empirical evidence? It is clearly consistent with the experience of the European Union in
the 1990s, when the dismantling of non-tari⁄ barriers on internal trade under the Single Market programme
coincided with a huge in￿ ow of extra-EU FDI especially from the U.S. The Irish economy in particular
exempli￿ed this pattern, with many ￿rms locating giant plants far larger than need to service the Irish
market, causing both FDI and exports to rise in tandem. The model therefore reinforces the view that
FDI, attracted by the deepening of the EU Single Market, was a major cause of the ￿Celtic Tiger￿boom,
which saw double-digit growth rates in GDP for much of the 1990s. (See Barry (1999).) As for econometric
evidence, most of the literature looks only at bilateral ￿ ows of FDI, but two recent papers present evidence
8that supports the importance of the export-platform motive. Head and Mayer (2004) study Japanese FDI in
European regions and ￿nd that it is encouraged by market potential, which they measure using both host-
region GDP and the GDP￿ s of adjacent regions. Blonigen et al. (2004) use spatial econometric techniques to
measure distance e⁄ects beyond adjacent countries. They ￿nd evidence against agglomeration e⁄ects: higher
U.S. FDI in neighboring countries reduces the amount of U.S. FDI into individual European countries; but
in favour of the export-platform hypothesis: higher GDP in neighboring countries increases U.S. FDI.
As for the prediction that falling intra-bloc trade barriers should encourage plant consolidation, Pavelin
and Barry (2005) address this in a study of the geographical diversi￿cation of 290 leading European ￿rms
between 1987 and 1993. Contrary to the hypothesis, they ￿nd that diversi￿cation increased substantially
over this period, which roughly coincides with the deepening of the Single Market. However, as they note,
their sample does not include many U.S. ￿rms; it covers only very large ￿rms, which are likely to be multi-
product and even multi-industry; and they measure the geographical diversi￿cation of a ￿rm by the number
of countries in which it operates rather than by the variance of its production or sales across countries.
By contrast, evidence in favour of the plant consolidation hypothesis can be found in Belderbos (1997, pp.
33, 77), who notes that Japanese electronics ￿rms followed a strategy of locating VCR plants in many EC
countries in the early 1980s, but divested many of these multiple plants and concentrated on ￿best￿locations
in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Clearly more work is needed on this topic.
5 Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions
So far, I have assumed that all FDI involves constructing a new plant in a foreign country, the so-called
￿green￿eld￿case. However, the most important form of FDI in reality is not the green￿eld type but rather
cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As), where a foreign ￿rm purchases an existing ￿rm in the host
country. UNCTAD (2000) documents the importance of M&As in the world economy, noting that they
grew rapidly in the 1990s, both absolutely and relative to green￿eld FDI: the share of M&As in the total
value of world FDI exceeded 80% in 1999, and cross-border M&As were particularly important in FDI ￿ ows
between developed countries.9 By contrast, the enormous scholarly literature on FDI has concentrated on
the green￿eld case. In this section I review some recent work which attempts to redress this balance, and
discuss its implications for the e⁄ects of trade costs on FDI.
In discussing M&As, it seems very desirable, for the ￿rst time, to adopt an explicitly oligopolistic ap-
proach. One reason is empirical: according to UNCTAD (2000), the principal di⁄erence between green￿eld
9UNCTAD caution that the data on green￿eld and M&A FDI are not fully comparable. The data on total FDI come from
balance of payments statistics, those on cross-border M&As from Thompson, a consultancy group, so the latter is not a proper
subset of the former. See Head and Ries (2005) for further discussion. However, the importance of cross-border M&As is
uncontroversial.
9and M&A FDI is a persistent concentration e⁄ect: markets with more mergers and acquisitions are more
concentrated. A second reason is conceptual. The theory of industrial organisation emphasizes two broad
motives for M&As: a strategic motive, as acquiring ￿rms gain from a reduction in competition, and an
e¢ ciency motive, as acquisitions lead to synergies through internal technology transfer, economies of scale,
and coordination of production and marketing decisions. Of these, the former can only be considered in a
model which explicitly allows for perceived interdependence between ￿rms, and both suggest that ￿rms are
large relative to the markets in which they operate. Hence in this section I present a model of cross-border
mergers in oligopolistic markets introduced in Neary (2003, 2004).10 This concentrates on the strategic
motive for M&As. As we shall see, it also throws light on the theme of the paper, how trade liberalisation
can encourage rather than discourage FDI.
The setting is an industry with n home ￿rms, all with unit cost c, and n￿ foreign ￿rms, all with unit
cost c￿. Assume that the two countries have a completely integrated market. Write the total pro￿ts of a
home ￿rm as a function of all these variables: ￿ (c;c￿;n;n￿). (I abstract from ￿rm-level ￿xed costs, since
they would provide a trivial justi￿cation for mergers.) It is plausible to assume that pro￿ts are decreasing
in own costs c, increasing in foreign costs c￿, and that the own e⁄ect dominates the cross-e⁄ect. Hence I will
con￿ne attention to this case.11 In the absence of foreign rivals, the threshold level of home costs consistent
with breaking even is ~ c, de￿ned as the price which drives demand to zero.12 With active foreign rivals, the
threshold level of home costs consistent with breaking even is de￿ned as an implicit function of the rivals￿
costs by ￿ (c;c￿;n;n￿) = 0. Given my assumptions on the derivatives of ￿, this yields a locus in fc;c￿g space
for given numbers of home and foreign ￿rms, which is upward-sloping though less steeply-sloped than the 45￿
line, as illustrated in Figure 4. Hence, with symmetric assumptions concerning foreign ￿rms, the diagram
is divided into four regions as shown. In region O it not pro￿table for any ￿rms to serve the market; in
regions F and H only ￿rms from foreign or home respectively are pro￿table; while in region HF both types
of ￿rm are pro￿table. The latter region, or ￿cone of diversi￿cation￿is the most interesting case, since low-
and high-cost ￿rms coexist there. The pattern of trade is clear: at all points above the 45￿ line, home ￿rms
are at a cost disadvantage and so are smaller in size than foreign ￿rms in the same sector. Hence there is a
presumption that the home country is the importer for points above the 45￿ line, and this holds exactly if
10Cross-border mergers have been studied in models of large-group monopolistic competition by Barba Navaretti and Venables
(2004, Chapter 3) and Nocke and Yeaple (2004), and in a model emphasising the market for corporate control but abstracting
from trade ￿ows (and hence from trade costs) by Head and Ries (2005). My approach is closer to the small but rapidly growing
literature on cross-border mergers in oligopolistic markets exempli￿ed by van Long and Vousden (1995), Falvey (1998), Horn
and Persson (2001), Bertrand and Zitouna (2003) and Ferrett (2004).
11Exact conditions are given in Neary (2002, Appendix A.2). As often in oligopoly theory, the properties hold provided that
demand is not too convex.
12The threshold ~ c is independent of n as well as of c￿ and n￿. This follows from the typical home ￿rm￿ s ￿rst-order condition
in the absence of any foreign ￿rms, which is p(ny) + yp0 (ny) = c. If the demand function has constant elasticity ~ c is in￿nite,
while if it is linear ~ c equals its intercept.
10the two countries are symmetric (with equal market size, and with the same number of home ￿rms as foreign
￿rms in each industry). In the perfectly competitive case where entry of new ￿rms into the industry was
free, the HF region would collapse to the 45￿ line, as only low-cost ￿rms would survive, and so specialisation
patterns would re￿ ect perfectly the two countries￿comparative advantage.
The cone HF is also the only region in which mergers may take place. In the F and H regions all ￿rms
are the same, and a classic result in industrial organisation, due to Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983),
states that bilateral mergers are not pro￿table in an industry with more than two identical ￿rms. Salant et
al. con￿ned attention to cases where ￿rms have identical costs, whereas Neary (2004) shows that provided
costs are su¢ ciently di⁄erent then bilateral mergers are indeed pro￿table. To see why, de￿ne the gain from
a takeover of a home ￿rm by a foreign ￿rm as GFH:13
GFH (c;c￿;n;n￿) = ￿￿￿ (c;c￿;n;n￿) ￿ ￿ (c;c￿;n;n￿) (5)
This consists of two parts. The ￿rst is the change in the acquiring ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts as the market becomes more
concentrated following a takeover which reduces the number of home ￿rms from n to n￿1: ￿￿￿ (c;c￿;n;n￿) ￿
￿￿ (c;c￿;n ￿ 1;n￿) ￿ ￿￿ (c;c￿;n;n￿). Since oligopoly pro￿ts are decreasing in the number of ￿rms, this is
always positive. The second is the initial pro￿ts of the target home ￿rm, ￿ (c;c￿;n;n￿), which is the amount
that it must be paid to persuade it to sell. Along the boundary between the F and HF regions in Figure 4
both of these terms are zero, since the home ￿rm￿ s output is zero, so both its own pro￿ts, and its impact on
other ￿rms￿pro￿ts if it ceases production, are zero. As c￿ falls, the changes in the two terms can be deduced
with the help of Figure 5, adapted from Leahy and Neary (2005). This shows how the two terms change
as the cost competitiveness of the home ￿rm rises, holding c, n and n￿ constant.14 Both increase, but the
￿￿￿ term increases more rapidly at ￿rst. Why? Because the home ￿rm is initially very small, and its pro￿ts
increase with the square of its output. By contrast, eliminating a small ￿rm raises industry price and so
increases the foreign ￿rm￿ s price-cost margin, giving it additional pro￿ts on every unit is sells. As the home
￿rm￿ s cost competitiveness continues to rise (moving to the right of point Q in Figure 5), its initial pro￿ts
increase more rapidly, whereas the change in the foreign ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts from eliminating it rise approximately
linearly. (See the Appendix, Section 7.2, for details.) At some point, denoted R in Figure 5, the two curves
intersect, so the gain from taking over the home ￿rm becomes zero: the foreign ￿rm would bene￿t greatly
from the reduction in competition, but cannot a⁄ord to buy the by-now relatively large home ￿rm. Finally,
13Strictly speaking, this is a myopic gain, since it does not take account of the e⁄ect of one takeover on the pro￿tability of
further takeovers between the remaining n + n￿ ￿ 1 ￿rms. Neary (2004) shows that similar results can be obtained when the
model is extended to allow ￿rms to have forward-looking expectations of future takeovers.
14This ￿gure is drawn on the assumption that the demand function is linear with intercept a. The home ￿rm￿ s cost compet-
itiveness is measured by a ￿ c.
11from Salant et al. we know that the gain is strictly negative when the home ￿rm￿ s cost competitiveness rises
to the level of the foreign ￿rm, a ￿ c￿.
All this implies that there is a range, denoted QR in Figure 5, within which home ￿rms make positive
pro￿ts but are vulnerable to acquisition by foreign ￿rms. This corresponds to the region indicated in Figure
6 where, relative to Figure 4, the F region expands relative to the FH region. (Symmetric reasoning with
the roles of the two countries reversed implies that there is a second region in Figure 6 where the H region
expands relative to the FH region, as low-cost home ￿rms acquire high-cost foreign ones.) Now consider
the implications of this analysis for the e⁄ects of trade liberalisation. Starting in autarky, home ￿rms face
no competition, so they produce positive levels of output in that sub-region of F where their cost is less
than the threshold level ~ c. Trade liberalisation alone eliminates home ￿rms in region F, and (in the case of
symmetric countries) leads all foreign ￿rms above the 45￿ line to export into the home market. If restrictions
on cross-border M&As are also lifted, then as we have seen the region within which home ￿rms can survive
compresses even further. This gives the ￿rst prediction of the model: cross-border mergers take place in
the same direction as trade ￿ ows, and they serve to move the pattern of international specialisation closer
to what would prevail under perfect competition. In both senses cross-border mergers can be viewed as
￿instruments of comparative advantage￿ .
The second prediction of the model follows from the fact that GFH is decreasing in the number of home
￿rms n. A takeover of one home ￿rm causes both curves in Figure 5 to pivot upwards around the point Q,
but the gain to a takeover ￿￿￿ rises by more than the cost ￿. Intuitively, the potential acquiring ￿rm is
larger with n ￿ 1 rivals than with n, so its gain in pro￿ts (which equal the increase in its price-cost margin
times its total output) rises faster than the pro￿ts of the home ￿rm (which are proportional to the square
of its output). Hence the acquisition of one home ￿rm increases the incentive for another to be acquired,
so that mergers are likely to come in waves, with one bilateral acquisition prompting another until all the
small and relatively ine¢ cient ￿rms in the sector have been acquired.
Finally, while the analysis so far has considered the incentives for cross-border M&As when trade is fully
liberalized and the markets are integrated, it can be extended to allow for intermediate tari⁄levels, assuming
that the markets are segmented.15 The e⁄ects of a small reduction in an existing tari⁄ on the gain from a
merger must now take account of the change in the acquiring ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts and the initial pro￿ts of the target
￿rm in both markets. Trade liberalisation increases the home ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts on its initial exports, and this in
itself makes it a more expensive takeover target, so making cross-border M&As less likely. On the other hand,
trade liberalisation also increases the foreign ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts from exporting as well as reducing both ￿rms￿
pro￿ts in their home markets, both of which make cross-border M&As more likely. In the neighbourhood
15I am very grateful to Philippe Martin for detailed suggestions on this case. See also van Long and Vousden (1995).
12of autarky the ￿rst e⁄ect does not arise and so at high trade costs a small amount of trade liberalisation
unambiguously raises the likelihood of cross-border M&As.
Turning ￿nally to empirical evidence, Brakman, Garretsen and van Marrewijk (2005) is the only paper
to date which explicitly tests the ￿instruments of comparative advantage￿ theory of cross-border M&As.
They consider data on cross-border M&As between ￿ve OECD countries in twenty sectors over the period
1980-2004 and ￿nd strong evidence of a role for comparative advantage. Speci￿cally, acquiring ￿rms in
cross-border mergers and acquisitions come disproportionally from sectors which have a revealed comparative
advantage, as measured by the standard Balassa index. They also ￿nd evidence that mergers are positively
autocorrelated within sectors, consistent with the hypothesis that mergers occur in waves. Of course, these
results may be consistent with other theories too, so further work is needed to test their robustness.
6 Conclusion
This paper has reviewed the theory of foreign direct investment, using as an organizing principle an apparent
con￿ ict between received theory and recent trends in the globalized world. Conventional wisdom holds that
the bulk of FDI is horizontal rather than vertical, aimed at replicating production facilities abroad to improve
access to foreign markets rather than breaking up the production process to bene￿t from lower production
costs. This view is reinforced by most, though not all, of the empirical evidence. Given this, we should
expect falls in trade costs to discourage FDI, since this is one of the predictions of the standard model of
horizontal FDI, which emphasizes a proximity-concentration trade-o⁄. However, this seems to con￿ ict with
the experience of the 1990s, when trade liberalisation and technological change led to dramatic reductions
in trade costs yet FDI grew much faster than trade. Two possible resolutions to this paradox have been
explored. First, horizontal FDI in trading blocs is encouraged by intra-bloc trade liberalisation, because
foreign ￿rms establish plants in one country as export platforms to serve the bloc as a whole. Second,
cross-border mergers, which are quantitatively more important than green￿eld FDI, are encouraged rather
than discouraged by falling trade costs.
One broad conclusion which follows from the literature reviewed here is that the distinction between
horizontal and vertical FDI is useful for pedagogic purposes but otherwise not very helpful. In practice most
multinational corporations pursue what Yeaple (2003a), following United Nations (1998), calls ￿complex
integration strategies￿ , which do not ￿t neatly into either the horizontal or vertical categories. Export-
platform FDI as discussed in Section 4 is one example of such a strategy: though modelled here as purely
horizontal in the sense that no physical intermediate inputs are traded within the ￿rm, it implies that the
simple proximity-concentration trade-o⁄ does not apply easily to a world with more than two countries.
13Cross-border mergers and acquisitions are another example, implying that trade and FDI can move in the
same direction, even on the part of a single ￿rm. Clearly more analytical and empirical work is required to
disentangle the relative importance of these di⁄erent aspects of FDI.
147 Appendix
7.1 Operating Pro￿ts and Trade Costs
Write the operating pro￿ts of the foreign ￿rm serving the home market as a function of its output y and the
trade cost t:
~ ￿ (y;t) = [p(y) ￿ (c + t)]y (6)
where p(y) is the inverse demand function and c is the unit cost of production. The function used in the
text, ￿(t), is the value of ~ ￿ (y;t) when y is chosen at the pro￿t-maximising level:
￿(t) ￿ Max
y [~ ￿ (y;t)] (7)







+ ~ ￿t = ~ ￿t = ￿y < 0 (8)
where the envelope property follows from the ￿rst-order condition: ~ ￿y = p + yp0 ￿ (c + t) = 0. Totally
di⁄erentiating the ￿rst-order condition gives: ~ ￿yydy + ~ ￿ytdt = 0, which implies that output is a decreasing










where the negative sign follows from the second-order condition: ~ ￿yy = 2p0 +yp00 < 0. This also implies that
the boundaries between the X and FDI regions in Figures 1 and 3 and between the D and FDI regions in
Figure 2 are concave.
7.2 Merger Gains
To evaluate the merger gain GFH, we make use of the always-useful result that a ￿rm￿ s operating pro￿ts in
any market are proportional to the square of output: ￿ = by2, which follows from the ￿rst-order condition
p ￿ c = by, where b is the inverse demand slope. (Note that this holds under all market structures and
demand systems, though when demand is non-linear b depends on the sales of all ￿rms.)
The two components of the gain from a merger depend on the initial outputs of a typical home and
foreign ￿rm, which can be written as follows (using A ￿ a ￿ c and A￿ ￿ a ￿ c￿ to denote each ￿rm￿ s cost
15competitiveness, and ￿ n ￿ n + n￿ to denote the total number of ￿rms):
y (c;c￿;n;n￿) =
(n￿ + 1)A ￿ n￿A￿
b(￿ n + 1)
y￿ (c;c￿;n;n￿) =
(n + 1)A￿ ￿ nA
b(￿ n + 1)
(10)
It follows immediately that ￿ is quadratic in A. As for the change in the acquiring foreign ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts, this
can be factorized as follows:
￿￿￿ (c;c￿;n;n￿) = b[y￿ (c;c￿;n ￿ 1;n￿) + y￿ (c;c￿;n;n￿)][y￿ (c;c￿;n ￿ 1;n￿) ￿ y￿ (c;c￿;n;n￿)] (11)
Direct calculations (following Neary (2004, Appendix)) show that:








Di⁄erentiating these with respect to c and n gives the properties of Figure 5 discussed in the text.
16References
Anderson, James E. and Eric van Wincoop (2004): ￿Trade Costs,￿Journal of Economic Literature, 42,
September, 691-751.
Anderson, James E. and J. Peter Neary (2005): Measuring the Restrictiveness of International Trade
Policy, forthcoming, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Barba Navaretti, Giorgio, Anthony J. Venables et al. (2004): Multinational Firms in the World Economy,
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Barry, Frank (1999) (ed.): Understanding Ireland￿ s Economic Growth, London: Macmillan.
Belderbos, RenØ and Leo Sleuwaegen (1998): ￿Tari⁄ jumping DFI and export substitution: Japanese
electronics ￿rms in Europe,￿International Journal of Industrial Organization, 16:5, September, 601-638.
Belderbos, RenØ (1997): Japanese Electronics Multinationals and Strategic Trade Policies, Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press.
Bergstrand, Je⁄rey H. and Peter Egger (2005): ￿A knowledge-and-physical-capital model of international
trade, foreign direct investment, and outsourcing: Part I, developed countries,￿mimeo., University of Notre
Dame, March.
Bertrand, Olivier and Hamid Zitouna (2003): "Trade liberalization and industrial restructuring: The
role of cross-border mergers and acquisitions," mimeo., UniversitØ de Paris I.
Blonigen, Bruce A., Ronald B. Davies, Glen R. Waddell, and Helen Naughton (2004): ￿FDI in space:
Spatial autoregressive relationships in foreign direct investment,￿mimeo., University of Oregon.
Brainard, S. Lael (1993): ￿An empirical assessment of the factor proportions explanation of multi-national
sales,￿Working Paper No. W4583, Cambridge Mass.: NBER, December.
Brainard, S. Lael (1997): ￿An empirical assessment of the proximity-concentration tradeo⁄ between
multinational sales and trade,￿American Economic Review 87, 520-544.
Brakman, Steven, Harry Garretsen and Charles van Marrewijk (2005): ￿Cross-border mergers and ac-
quisitions: On revealed comparative advantage and merger waves,￿mimeo., University of Groningen.
Carr, David, James R. Markusen, and Keith E. Maskus (2001), ￿Estimating the knowledge-capital model
of the multinational enterprise,￿American Economic Review, 91, 691-708.
Dunning, John H. (1973): ￿The determinants of international production,￿ Oxford Economic Papers,
New Series, 25:3, November, 289-336.
Ekholm, Karolina, Rikard Forslid and James R. Markusen (2003): ￿Export-platform foreign direct in-
vestment,￿Discussion Paper No. 3823, London: CEPR.
Falvey, Rod (1998): ￿Mergers in open economies,￿The World Economy, 21, 1061-1076.
17Ferrett, Ben (2004): ￿Green￿eld investment versus acquisition: Alternative modes of foreign expansion,￿
mimeo, University of Nottingham.
Grossman, Gene, Elhanan Helpman and Adam Szeidl (2004): ￿Optimal integration strategies for the
multinational ￿rm,￿Working Paper No. 10189, Cambridge, Mass.: NBER.
Head, Keith and Thierry Mayer (2004): ￿Market potential and the location of Japanese investment in
the European Union,￿Review of Economics and Statistics, 86:4, November, 959-972.
Head, Keith and John Ries (2005): ￿FDI as an outcome of the market for corporate control: Theory and
evidence,￿mimeo., Sauder School of Business, University of British Columbia, May.
Helpman, Elhanan (1984): ￿A simple theory of international trade with multinational corporations,￿
Journal of Political Economy, 92, 451-471.
Helpman, Elhanan, Marc Melitz and Stephen Yeaple (2004): ￿Exports versus FDI with heterogeneous
￿rms,￿American Economic Review, 94, March, 300-316.
Horn, Henrik and Lars Persson (2001): ￿The equilibrium ownership of an international oligopoly,￿Journal
of International Economics, 53, 307-333.
Jones, Ronald W. and J. Peter Neary (1984): ￿The positive theory of international trade,￿in R.W. Jones
and P.B. Kenen (eds.): Handbook of International Economics, Volume 1, Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1-62.
Leahy, Dermot and J. Peter Neary (2005): ￿Strategic and e¢ ciency motives for cross-border mergers,￿
mimeo., University College Dublin (in preparation).
Long, Ngo Van and Neil Vousden (1995): ￿The e⁄ects of trade liberalization on cost-reducing horizontal
mergers,￿Review of International Economics, 3, 141-155.
Markusen, James R. (1983): ￿Factor movements and commodity trade as complements,￿ Journal of
International Economics, 14, 341-356.
Markusen, James R. (2002): Multinational Firms and the Theory of International Trade, Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT Press.
Motta, Massimo and George Norman (1996): ￿Does economic integration cause foreign direct invest-
ment?,￿International Economic Review, 37(4), 757-783.
Mundell, Robert (1957): ￿International trade and factor mobility,￿American Economic Review, 47:3,
321-335.
Neary, J. Peter (1995): ￿Factor mobility and international trade,￿Canadian Journal of Economics, 28,
November 1995, S4-S23.
Neary, J. Peter (2002): ￿Foreign direct investment and the single market,￿The Manchester School, 70:3,
June, 291-314.
18Neary, J. Peter (2003): ￿Globalization and market structure,￿Journal of the European Economic Asso-
ciation, 1:2-3, April-May, 245-271.
Neary, J. Peter (2004): ￿Cross-border mergers as instruments of comparative advantage,￿ Discussion
Paper No. 4325, London: CEPR.
Neary , J. Peter and Cormac ￿ GrÆda (1991) ￿Protection, economic war and structural change: The
1930s in Ireland,￿Irish Historical Studies, 27, May, 250-266.
Nocke, Volker and Stephen Yeaple (2004): ￿Mergers and the composition of international commerce,￿
mimeo., University of Pennsylvania.
Pavelin, Stephen and Frank Barry (2005): ￿The Single Market and the geographical diversi￿cation of
leading ￿rms in the EU,￿The Economic and Social Review, 36: 1, Spring, 1￿ 17.
Salant, Stephen, S. Switzer and R. Reynolds (1983): ￿Losses due to merger: The e⁄ects of an exogenous
change in industry structure on Cournot-Nash equilibrium,￿Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98, 185-199.
Smith, Alasdair (1987): ￿Strategic investment, multinational corporations and trade policy,￿European
Economic Review, 31, 89-96.
UNCTAD (2000): World Investment Report: Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions and Development,
New York and Geneva: United Nations.
United Nations (1998): World Investment Report, Centre for Transnational Corporations, New York:
United Nations.
Yeaple, Stephen (2003a): ￿The complex integration strategies of multinational ￿rms and cross-country
dependencies in the structure of foreign direct investment,￿Journal of International Economics, 60:2, August,
293-314.
Yeaple, Stephen (2003b): ￿The role of skill endowments in the structure of U.S. outward foreign direct






f = = = =     π π π π(0)–π π π π(t)
π π π π(0)







Fig. 2:  Vertical FDI
~ t
f = = = =     π π π π*(w+t*)–π π π π*(w*)
f = = = =     π π π π*(w+t*)2
τ τ τ τ t
f = π π π π(0)+π π π π(τ τ τ τ)–2π π π π(t)
π π π π(0)
π π π π(0)+π π π π(τ τ τ τ)






Fig. 3: The Proximity-Concentration Trade-Off II:
External Trade-Cost-Jumping + Export-Platform Motives
Fig. 4:  Equilibrium Production Patterns
in Free Trade without FDI
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